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ABSTRACT 
Revenue mobilization is one of the most important restrictions for economic growth in 
middle and low-income countries, given the high dependence on natural resources. 
Colombia is not an exception, and in fact, the current coal industry’s position contributes 
close to 1.6% of the GDP. As a consequence, the royalties systems and tax collection 
structure from 20 years ago are still valid. Yet, in the last few years, due to high coal prices, 
some arguments consider that the income produced by current mining and royalty rates is 
insufficient and should be increased. This paper evaluates the current Royalty Policy of 
Coal Mining in Colombia using a Mixed Integer Linear Programming Model. This strategy 
allows for the estimation of the optimal royalty rate under an approach that maximizes the 
present value of the revenue from private sector payments to the Colombian Government. 
The results show that under the current royalty scheme and assumptions applied, the 
royalty rate is quite close to optimal. However, the royalty system represents a huge risk to 
the development of exploration activities and mining projects given the lag of neutrality for 
investments, and approaches based on company profit offer interesting alternatives. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Mining taxes and royalties have evolved from an approach in which individuals hold all 
rights to exploitation of renewable resources to one of extreme nationalism in which 
governments exercise their sovereign rights to impose taxes on an industry to promote the 
common welfare of its citizens. Regardless of the approach considered, natural resources 
are a key to economic development, and this situation calls for the need to build an 
adequate structure that allows governments to benefit from these resources and increase 
the welfare of the people. To this end, it is of utmost importance to adopt an optimal 
revenue structure that considers both the efficiency of the firm and government revenues.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature by examining the current policy and 
practices of coal mining royalties in Colombia and develops a methodical application of the 
theoretical concepts developed by Otto, Cawood and Tilton 2006 on royalty and mining 
taxation. This methodology allows estimation of the optimal compensation to mining 
companies and to the government for exploitation of those resources as framed by 
maximizing the welfare of its citizens. The analysis is based on maximization of the net 
present value of the cash flow produced by revenues from private firms. In addition, the 
paper presents a review of the most common practices worldwide in compensation via coal 
royalties, an analysis of optimality of the current methodology for compensation for coal 
royalties in Colombia, a methodological proposal for the collection of these royalties, and 
estimation of the optimal royalty rate for coal mining in Colombia. 
In recent years, it is generally agreed that the mining industry justifies special treatment 
for the sector due to large periods without revenues (exploration, pre-stripping1 and 
reclamation), large capital investments, cyclical revenues due to commodity prices, and 
substantial risks due to geological uncertainty. Therefore, the complementarities between 
the private and public sector in terms of revenue mobilization from natural resources 
should be exploited. Moreover, public policies should be designed to attract public and 
private investment to maximize welfare through the exploitation of new deposits and 
exploration of new prospects.  
Colombia is one of the countries in which the nation has an important role in the coal 
mining industry worldwide. The Mining and Energy Planning Unit (UPME)2 has estimated 
that Colombia contains 0.8% of world coal reserves with 6593 Mton3, ranking in twelfth 
place worldwide, as shown in Figure 1. Colombia is the country with the largest reserves in 
Latin America and is located in a privileged place given its geological potential and its 
strategic location relative to the main consumption centers of Asia Pacific and North 
America.  
 
                                            
1 Defined as the required movement required in the mine to expose the ore in the mine. 
2 UPME Unidad de Planeación minero Energético. 
3 Extracted from (Unit of Planning of Mining and Energy, 2012). 
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Figure 1. World Reserves of Coal 
 
  Source: Statistical Review of World Energy Full Report 2013, British Petroleum Company 
 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the current policy of coal royalties in Colombia 
(methodology and rates) under an approach that maximizes the revenue from tax 
payments to Colombians and to propose a methodology aligned with this concept. The coal 
industry in Colombia has strongly contributed to the economic dynamics observed in the 
last decade, and its contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been growing. In 
2011, these contributions accounted for 1.57% of the GDP, which was leveraged by a 
sustained increase in domestic production, an increase in global energy demand, and good 
prices in recent years, as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Mining and Coal GDP 
 
 Source: DANE 
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In addition, exports of coal and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the sector present 
similar behavior. According to the Colombian Central Bank, coal exports between 2001 and 
2011 amounted to approximately 14% of total exports. Moreover, FDI in the sector is on 
the rise together with the development of deposits under exploitation and exploration of 
the territory. Between 2001 and 2011, the FDI in the sector was approximately M$US 
17000, which is close to 20% of the total foreign direct investment in the country. 
Over the last decade, coal mining has accounted for more than 75% of the royalties paid by 
the mining sector to the government. Between 2009 and 2011, coal mining paid 1.2 billion 
pesos per year on average to the Colombian government, whose resources represent half of 
the current agricultural budget of the country or the cumulative budget of the sectors of 
environment and development, culture, and science and technology. In addition, this 
amount could finance current government flagship programs such as the “100,000 free 
houses for the people“, as shown in Figure 3.  
Figure 3. Royalties paid by Colombian mining 
 
 Source: Ministry Mines and Energy, Ecocarbón, Minercol, Ingeominas (2008 - 2011) 
With these basic facts in mind, it is clear that the coal industry is of primary importance for 
Colombia`s development given its contributions to macroeconomic factors as well as its 
importance in terms of government revenue.  
The structure of the paper is described as follows. Section 2 presents a summary of the 
development of Colombian royalty payments for coal mining since the early 20th century 
to the present. Section 3 describes the theoretical foundations of the main approaches to 
royalties worldwide and uses dynamic optimization theory as an alternative to understand 
and estimate the optimal rate for a given scheme. Section 4 develops a conceptual and 
mathematical model used in the estimation of an optimal royalty rate under different 
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schemes and summarizes the results. Section 5 presents the conclusions and policy 
recommendations based on the obtained results. 
2 MINING ROYALTIES IN THE COLOMBIAN COAL INDUSTRY 
2.1  Evolution of Coal Royalties 
The mining of coal in Colombia began with the first steam railroads in the early years of the 
twentieth century. Subsequently, energy was consumed by the industrial sector, but the 
demand was small and was supplied by small mines in the center of the country. Electrical 
generation and the construction of the “Acerias Paz del Rio” steel firm significantly 
increased the demand for coal and the production of mines located close to the projects 
and also introduced the first big jump in the coal industry in Colombia (Franco, 2007). In 
the late 1960s, almost all of the production of intermediate goods was based on coal-based 
energy. 
In the early seventies, the global oil crisis, expansion of the electrical demand and a lack of 
clear policies for exploration and exploitation of oil created the need for a new energy 
policy. At that time, the country established development and exploitation of the potential 
coal deposits as the main energy strategy to supply the domestic demand, and the 
surpluses were marked for trade on the world market. As result of the promotion, 
dissemination and marketing of the coal potential of the country, at the end of this decade, 
the first large-scale coal mining contracts were signed for the northern region of Colombia. 
Over eighty years, the interest of foreign capital in the Colombian deposits increased 
significantly, and huge investments in thermic coal projects in the departments of Guajira 
and Cesar significantly increased the production of the operating companies and 
exploration activities. In subsequent years, these sectors have continued with similar 
dynamics, and new capital has been invested in this area to maximize production and take 
advantage of the high price cycles, as shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Coal Production in Colombia. 
 
  Source: Republic Bank, 1990-2000 Mine Ministry, 2001-2003 Minercol, 2004 - 2011 Ingeominas. 
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The coal production of the country has subsequently set records over the last ten years in 
accordance with corporate strategies designed to take advantage of high prices supported 
by expansions of production capacity and the resources invested in exploration over 
previous years, as illustrated in Figure 4 and Figure 5.  
Figure 5. Coal Resources and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Colombia. 
 
 Source: Republic Bank, adaptation by Geoperforaciones and Mining LTDA, UPME 
The coal industry in Colombia has invested its surpluses in improving processing 
technology and knowledge of deposits. As a result, new coal reserves have been discovered, 
thus creating value for stakeholders in the long term. However, is it necessary to continue 
this dynamic, which requires aligning fiscal policy with this aim. In the royalty case, a basic 
relationship must be determined between the coal royalty rate and the net present value of 
government income to determine the optimal policy of this aspect. A disproportionate coal 
royalty rate will decrease the amount of investment and produce an adverse effect on the 
net present value of government revenue, but a notably small rate will drastically decrease 
this effect. 
2.2  Current Policy of Coal Royalties 
The 1991 Colombian Constitution established in article 332 that the state owns the subsoil 
and non-renewable resources, and the articles 360 and 361 stated that the exploitation of 
these resources requires “economic compensation” favor of the state, i.e., royalties. The 
concept of “economics” framed the royalties in a social context. This instrument was 
designed and included as a constitutional mandate because its implementation would 
positively impact the welfare of individuals. However, it appears that the current regulation 
of the payment methodology is not aligned with this concept, and the economic nature of 
this instrument requires that the payment methodology and rates should reflect an 
optimization approach for citizen revenues, i.e., the payment must maximize the net 
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present value of the benefits for the people, which must be analyzed over a long-term 
framework and not only focused on short-term interests. 
Coal royalties are an example of this divergence. Law 141 of 1994 created the National 
Royalties Fund and the National Royalties Commission but also regulated the state rights to 
receive royalties from the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources and established 
rules for settlement and distribution. Article 16 of this Law, which was subsequently 
amended by Law 756 of 2002, set a royalty for the exploitation of coal as a national 
property, i.e., 10% if the exploitation exceeds 3 million tons per year or 5% if the 
exploitation is less than 3 million tons per year, as applied to the value of production in the 
Run of Mine4 or pit edge, as appropriate, which is summarized by the formula 
                      (1) 
where 
Pd = Mine production in a time period. 
Pm: Base price of raw mineral fixed by the Mines Ministry of Colombia5. 
Pl: Royalty percentage fixed by Law 141 of 1994 (modified by Law 756 of 2002), 10% or 
5% depending on the coal production. Table 1 shows the royalty rate fixed by the 
Colombian government in Law 141 of 1994 (modified by Law 756 of 2002) for the main 
minerals. 
Table 1. Royalty percentage for Colombian mining 
Mineral Measure Unit Royalty percentage 
Coal productions > 3MTon per year % 10% 
Coal productions < 3MTon per year  % 5% 
Nickel % 12% 
Iron and y Copper % 5% 
Gold and Silver % 4% 
Platinum % 5% 
Salt % 12% 
Limestone, Plaster, Clays y Gravel % 1% 
Radioactive Ore6 % 10% 
Metallic Ore % 5% 
No metallic Ore % 3% 
 Source: Colombian Congress (1994) 
 
The elements in the liquidation formula are transparent; its structure is quite simple and 
has been consistent for 20 years, thus demonstrating stability over time, which are 
characteristics that favor the administration and management of these terms. However, the 
law is not clear on the criteria used for the determination of rates of payment for a set of 
                                            
4 Run of Mine (ROM): Raw ore mined and transported to the limits of mine does not include processing. 
5 The Ministry of Mines and Energy fix the price to be used in royalty liquidation through periodic resolutions. 
6 Ore: Portion a mineral deposit that can be extracted with an economical benefit. 
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minerals; whereas such minerals as nickel and coal have higher rates exceeding 10%, the 
rates for other minerals mined in the country do not exceed 5%, which reveals inequities in 
the design of this parameter. Royalties paid by any coal-mining firm in Colombia are 
proportional to the value of production (revenue or rent), which reflects a lack of efficiency 
and neutrality. The World Bank (Otto, et al., 2006) has studied these types of royalties 
based on rent and argue that the absence of neutrality lies in the lack of importance that 
this methodology gives to whether “the mine is making a profit or losing money”. Royalties 
based on rent fluctuate following commodity prices, and thus, when prices are high, the 
government will enjoy more revenue than when prices are low (Otto, et al., 2006), which 
adversely affects the interests of the state in certain cases compared with royalties based 
on the profit of the companies, especially in times of low prices.  
The current methodology for coal royalties assumes that all projects have the same 
economic reality, which varies widely in practice, unlike that of other businesses. 
Geological variables make each deposit unique, and therefore, the cost structure associated 
with mining and processing of minerals contributes to the concept of shared risk between 
different operators and the operators and the state, which is essential to attract investment 
capital to develop projects in the country. From the perspective of resource utilization, the 
current design of royalty payments for coal can distort decisions on production, cut off7, 
and economical stripping ratios8, and therefore the amount of reserve reported because all 
mines must pay regardless of whether they make a profit. In the early years of a production 
plan, when stripping ratios are low, the cash flow is impacted, but this impact is still 
positive. However, in the final years, when stripping ratios are high, cash flow is marginal 
and thus an extra variable cost can reduce the life of the mine and therefore the ore 
reserves. 
From the elements of the liquidation formula, the percentage of royalty (royalty rate, Pl) is 
based on public policies; therefore, its application must be addressed to maximize the 
welfare of the citizens. However, given the intergovernmental nature9 of the mining 
business, its application cannot be based on nationalist arguments in which the 
government policy is removed in the short term and the most profit possible is collected at 
the cost of sterilizing the coal deposits in the medium- or long-term. However, the answer 
is also not the capitalist argument in which private investment becomes an end in itself and 
therefore the compensation received by the country in exploiting its coal resources is 
minimal. As summarized by J. Tilton (Tilton, 2004), “the sovereign states, mineral 
producing nations should pursue taxation and other policies that achieve, to the maximum 
extent possible, the goals and objectives they have for their mineral sector. For private 
companies, economics normally assumes that the goal, or objective function, is to maximize 
profits. Over time, this means maximizing the net present value of a firm or its wealth 
creation”. 
                                            
7 Cut off: Concentration of the element of interest in the mineral at which mining activity becomes 
economically attractive. 
8 Stripping ratio: Relationship between the number of units of waste material that must be removed to obtain 
a unit of mineral interest. 
9 A mineral deposit could survive more than one government. 
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In Colombia, although certain studies and legislation have been carried out based on this 
issue, efforts have been oriented more towards the most efficient distribution of resources 
from the royalty payments, but few efforts have analyzed whether the current payment 
methodologies adequately represent the spirit that the constituents of 1991 attempted to 
capture in the articles written on this subject, which is to provide welfare to the owners of 
non-renewable resources, i.e., the citizens. For the specific case of coal, the law in this sense 
dates back to 20 years ago and even offers signs of our fiscal stability framework for 
investors in the sector and obscures efficiency optimization criteria in its structure. 
Therefore, it is necessary to analyze this situation from an economic point of view, 
understand these criteria, and if necessary, adjust the policies to the main objective, which 
is to produce welfare for the people. 
3 MINING TAXATION AND OPTIMIZATION THEORY 
3.1  Mineral Resource Rents and Taxation 
The literature defines economic or Ricardian rents as the return to a firm or a factor of 
production over and above the amount expected by its owner, and therefore, it does not 
affect its economic behavior, i.e., it is “neutral”. Any taxation system will seek to collect rent 
from mineral resources exploitation due to its practical meaning and potential source of 
neutrality. This situation allows the owner of the resources to extract the rent without 
affecting production plans, which contribute to maximization of national welfare.  
In the early 19th century, Henry George argued that Ricardian rents are particularly 
appropriate targets for taxation, in part because taxes on rents do not alter economic 
behavior and thus do not introduce inefficiencies into the economy.  
Figure 6. Ricardian Rent on mining taxation 
 
Source: (Tilton, 2004) 
In addition, for the taxes shown in Figure 6 (Rent for Mine B), the rents seem fair or 
equitable. Mineral deposits differ in quality and incur different production costs, i.e., Mine 
C. The classes in Figure 6a depict different mines, and the horizontal axis measures the 
mine capacity. Mine A has the lowest production costs due to its rich ore and other factors. 
Mine B has the next lowest, and so on. For each mine, the area under the price line and 
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above its costs reflects its Ricardian rent. Figure 6b portrays the nature of the Ricardian 
rent associated with Mine B in additional detail and assumes that the mine’s costs (OCb) 
are its cash or variable costs of production. These costs reflect the minimum possible 
variable costs of production plus the portion of the potential rent that the government 
collects through taxes and other measures. If the price is at or above its cash costs (OCb), 
Mine B has (at least over the short run) an incentive to remain in operation. Consequently, 
at the price P2, is the mine earns a substantial amount of Ricardian rent. This rent can be 
divided into three components. The first (quasi-rent) component reflects the mine’s cost of 
capital and other fixed inputs and exists only in the short run. If the mine does not recover 
its cost of capital, including a competitive rate of return, it will not replace its capital, and in 
the long run, it will cease to operate. 
Whenever a case arises in which it appears appropriate to tax a rent, one must be careful 
that the apparent rent is not what economists since Marshall have referred to as ‘quasi-
rents’. Quasi-rents are payments that provide a certain incentive to maintain an 
economically valuable allocation of resources in the long term (Garnaut, Principles and 
Practice of Resource Rent Taxation, 2010). 
The taxation on mining companies mostly affects these quasi-rents. A current mine will not 
be closed because a tax does not allow generation of a satisfactory return on exploration, 
but new exploration will be affected. In the same way, a new tax on a mine in operation 
could transfer part or all of the quasi–rent of the pre-stripping10 activities from mine to the 
government without affecting the production plan; however, it is possible that this action 
will affect new investments.   
3.2  Methods of Mining Taxation 
As mentioned in several papers, the mining sector contains unique features and differs 
from other businesses, i.e., “quite risky, capital intensive, prone to wide commodity price 
fluctuations, and in nations where mineral ownership resides with the state, exploits a 
component of the national patrimony”11, which cause its own tax treatment to represent 
these features; thus, in certain cases, legislation taxes this activity as royalties or other 
granting incentives that attempt to compensate for the risk inherent in such projects.  
The literature argues for several criteria and classifications of taxes on mining activities 
around the world. Given the relevance of the application method for this work, we review 
two of the most relevant. 
First (Garnaut & Clunies, 1983) identified six main forms of mineral rent taxation: 1) a flat 
fee in which the investor makes a once-for-all payment for the rights to extract minerals 
from a leased area, 2) specific or ad valorem royalties that are applied to the volume or 
value of production, 3) a higher rate of proportional profits or income tax that applies a 
                                            
10 Initial overburden removal prior to the commencement of mining operations in an open pit. 
11 Extracted from (Otto, 2000). 
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higher rate of taxation to income received from the corporate sector, 4) a progressive 
profits tax that applies a higher rate of income tax in tax periods in which the amount of 
income (usually calculated as the rate of return on a selected measure of investment in the 
project) exceeds a specified level, 5) a resource rent tax that allows a mining firm a 
deduction for all expenditures against revenue in the year in which the expenditure was 
incurred focusing on net cash flows., 6) a brown tax that is structurally similar to resource 
rent tax except that instead of any negative cash flows carried forward with interest, the 
negative cash flows attract a payment equal to the product of the tax rate and the amount 
of the negative tax flow.  
In contrast, (Otto, et al., 2006) classified the mining taxes into two groups according to their 
application method: 1) In rem: Charges assessed against the mineral deposit or against the 
inputs and actions needed to exploit it; and 2) In personam: Charges against a given 
definition of net revenues, i.e., revenues less qualifying costs. 
Each of these views have arguments for and against, yet there is agreement that because 
the rem type is charged only for the fact that the ore is mined, these taxes typically create 
additional distortions on the decision of operators relative to production plans, cut offs, 
and mineable reserves that affect the survival of projects, especially those with marginal 
cash flows. 
The global mining sector has identified a representative group of taxes charged to 
investors. However, although these taxes seek a steady income and help to finance 
government spending, which is achieved in most cases, in others, it creates an 
unsustainable burden due to the lack of systemic vision of fiscal policies. Table 2 identifies 
a subset of policies and the objective behind collection. 
Table 2. Taxes Levied in the World Mining industry: Optimal mining taxation 
Tax Basis 
In rem taxes 
Unit – based Royalty Set charge per unit 
Ad valorem–based royalty % of mineral’s value (definition of value may vary) 
% of value of sales % of value of sales 
Property or capital tax % of value of property or capital 
Import duty % of value of imports (usually) 
Export duty % of value of exports 
Withholding on remitted loan interest % of loan interest value 
Withholding on imported services Inc % of value of services 
Value-added tax % of the value of the good or service 
Registration fees Set charge per registration event 
Rent or usage fees Set charge per unit area 
Stamp tax Set charge / transaction or % of value of transaction 
In personam taxes 
Income tax % of income 
Capital gains tax % of profit on disposal of capital assets 
Additional profits tax % of additional profits 
Excess profits tax % of excess profits 
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Net profits royalty or net value royalty % of mineral’s value less allowable costs 
Withholding on remitted profits % of remitted value 
Source: Author J. Otto 
 
As mentioned by (Otto, et al., 2006) and discussed previously, the mining sector contains 
special characteristics that make it different from other sectors of economic activity: 
 A lengthy period of exploration takes place during which there is no revenue. 
 The amount of capital required during the development and construction phases is 
relatively greater than that of most other businesses. 
 Once the mine is built, the capital is captive and not transportable. 
  Equipment tends to be specialized and is available only from a few manufacturers 
worldwide, and thus, it must be imported. 
 Mines can have long lifecycles and will be subject to regime changes and policy 
instability. 
 Revenues are cyclical because commodity prices move up and down more so than is 
experienced by most other businesses. 
 The scale of operations can be quite small or notably large. 
 Large costs will be incurred at the time that the project closes (reclamation). 
 Substantial costs unrelated to production may be incurred, i.e., investment in 
community infrastructure or programs. 
The mining business is associated not only with geological risk (meaning that its ore 
reserves might be overstated) but also the risk involved in capturing returns in the long 
term. A favorable environment in investor decision-making will be one in which at least the 
risk associated with the time horizon of the investment is as controlled as possible, and the 
government and its fiscal policies (among others) play a decisive role in ensuring that 
situation. 
What is the optimal allocation between the government and the firm for the revenue 
created by mining? The nationalist arguments say the government should receive the 
maximum possible percentage because citizens must be compensated for the exploitation 
of non-renewable natural resources. However, given the lucrative nature of private 
enterprise, its policy will also seek to maintain the highest possible percentage of this 
income. However, both private enterprise and government know that without the other, 
neither will derive benefits, and under this approach, the goals of private companies and 
the government are not necessarily opposed.  
The government of mineral-producing nations should pursue taxation and other policies 
that achieve the goals and objectives of welfare of their citizens to the maximum extent 
possible; however, these policies should allow a level of profit for private enterprise that 
stimulates new investment not only in the current projects in operation but also in 
exploration of the potential of the country, which will allow for future revenues. High tax 
rates will mean that companies halt exploration activities, expansions, and establishment of 
new mines or close mines in operation, but low taxes minimize the benefits to the 
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government and citizens of the host country. Somewhere between those points exists a tax 
rate T* measured as a percentage of profits where the NPV of the benefit of the country’s 
citizens is maximized, as shown in Figure 7. As the tax rate rises from zero to an optimal 
level (T*), the net present value of the stream of current and future government revenues 
increases. However, once the optimal level is reached, any further increase in the tax rate 
will cause companies to cut explorations for new deposits, halt development of new mines, 
and eventually, if the tax rate is pushed high enough, close their existing mines (NPV of 
government is zero) (Tilton, 2004). 
Figure 7. Government Tax Revenues as a Function of the Tax 
Rate 
 
 Source: (Tilton, 2004) 
 
3.3  Mining Royalties 
The dynamic that influences all royalty agreement negotiations is governed by what David 
E. Pierce has stated as the “royalty value theorem” (Pierce, 2002), which is to say: If 
compensation under a contract is based upon a set percentage of the value of an item, there 
will be a tendency by each party to either minimize or maximize the value. Put another 
way, every royalty can be expressed as x% (a - b), where “a” is the aggregate of what will be 
included in calculating the royalty and “b” is the aggregate of all deductions in calculating 
the royalty, and the theorem compels the operator to minimize “a” and maximize “b”; of 
course, the royalty holder will maximize “a” and minimize “b”. 
Nevertheless, most of the royalties paid worldwide are based on the fact that in the 
exploitation of mineral resources (in rem), the method of payment is applied in two 
different ways: per unit of raw production (unit-based) or based on the value of the unit of 
run of mine ore (value-based or ad valorem), thus seeking to discriminate between the 
scales of operations. However, as mentioned by several authors (Otto, et al., 2006), such 
royalties may affect the flows of marginal operations in remote locations where they are 
the only source of employment. In contrast, many countries levy royalties based on profit 
or income, and those who agree will argue that royalties should be paid under the concept 
of "to pay”. The concepts of profit and income seek to maximize the value of these items in 
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the long term; however, under this scheme, it is common to find pressures by governments 
because the profit margin is zero or negative in the early years of a project.. 
 
Table 3 provides a summary of coal royalties (rates and method) in several countries in the 
world and includes the legal origin of the royalty (national law, provincial law, or 
negotiated agreement), which is the predominant type of royalty. 
 Table 3. Summary of Coal Royalty Practices in World regions 
Tax Country 
Africa 
 Botswana Ghana Mozambique Namibia South Africa Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe 
Format National law National law and 
negotiated 
agreement acts 
National law National law Guidelines National law National law None 
Coal 5% ad valorem 
on adjusted gross 
market value 
3–12% graduated 
on operating ratio 
Negotiable within 3–
8% ad valorem, on 
market value 
Up to 5% ad 
valorem, on 
market value 
Negotiated within 
guidelines 
3% ad Valorem 
on net back 
value 
2% ad Valorem on 
net back value 
None 
Asia and Pacific 
 China India Indonesia Mongolia Myanmar Papua Guinea Philippines  
Format National law National law Model agreement National law National law National law National law  
Coal 1% ad valorem 
plus 0.3–5.0 yuan 
/ tonne 
5 to 250 rupees / 
tonne 
13.5% FOB or of sales 
revenue 
2.5% ad 
valorem on 
sales value 
 2% 10 pesos / tonne  
Australia 
 New South 
Wales 
Northern 
Territory 
Queensland Western 
Australia 
    
Format Provincial law Provincial law Provincial law Provincial law 
or negotiated 
agreement act 
    
Coal 5–7% ad valorem 18% on net back 
proceeds less 
production and 
other costs 
7% of value 7.5% of value if 
exported 
    
Latin America 
 Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Dominican 
Republic 
Mexico Peru Venezuela 
Format Provincial law National law National law None Provincial law Provincial law None Provincial law 
Coal Most provinces: 
no royalty; 
others: ad 
valorem 0–3% 
 
Ad valorem, sliding 
scale based on 
ratio, 1–6% based 
on sales price 
position relative to 
reference price 
bands 
Ad valorem, 0.2–3.0% 
 
n.a Ad valorem, 
creditable against 
income tax 5% of 
FOB export 
n.a Ad valorem, sliding 
scale based on 
annual cumulative 
sales, 0–3% 
(exported mineral 
1–3%; if no 
international price 
1%; small scale 
0%) 
Ad valorem, 3–
4% 
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North America 
 Arizona (U.S.) British Columbia 
(Canada) 
Michigan (U.S.) Nevada (U.S.) Northwest 
Territories 
(Canada) 
Ontario 
(Canada) 
Saskatchewan 
(Canada) 
 
Format Provincial law Provincial law Provincial law Provincial law National 
regulations 
Provincial law Provincial law  
Coal At least 2% of 
market price 
More than 13% of 
net revenue less 
2% of net proceeds, 
or 2% of net 
proceeds 
7% of sales value 5% of net 
proceeds 
(above US$4 
million per 
year) 
5–14% of out- put 
value 
10% of defined 
profits 
15% of gross sales 
adjusted by 
resource allowance 
 
Source: (Otto, et al., 2006)
 3.4  Optimal Royalty Rate 
As mentioned previously, every royalty can be expressed as x% (a - b), where x% is the 
royalty rate, the definition of which is a component of the fiscal policy of the government, 
which must respond to the clear criterion of maximizing the present value of the welfare of 
its citizens. 
Inter-temporal choice and the NPV approach 
Assume a mining firm has estimated R units of mineral as its ore reserves and wishes to 
produce q1, q2, q3…, qt units of ore in each time period t. Furthermore, suppose that the 
prices of production in each period are constant at 1, such that value of production each 
time period is q1, q2, q3…, qt and, 
                     (4) 
Moreover, the amount of money that the firm will take in is m1, m2, m3 …., mt units of money 
for each time period t.  
If we assume that the firm must borrow money at interest rate r, the budget constraint of 
the firm is: 
   
  
     
 
  
      
  
  
        
    
  
     
 
  
      
  
  
        
            (5) 
The production plan is affordable if the present value of production is equal to the present 
value of income (Varian, 2006). Rearranging equation 5: 
          
       
     
  
       
      
  
       
      
   
       
        
           (6) 
The firm seeks the production pattern that maximizes the present value of its profit. 
  ∫             
 
 
     (7) 
The taxation policy affects not only the choice of extraction rates q(t) but also the resources 
employed in exploration for new ore deposits. Assume that a certain exploration process at 
a cost of C(R) could augment the initial ore reserves12 (Thomas, 2010), and under this 
assumption, the economic behavior of the firm will be described by the function: 
  ∫                  
 
 
     (8) 
Under this approach, the path chosen is not altered, although the present value of this 
production plan is now smaller. 
                                            
12 Represents the present value of past exploration and development expenses at the moment of operation. 
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Optimization model 
The mining operator’s problem involves the choice of a length of time T for the mine to 
operate and determination of an extraction profile (q(t)) to solve the problem (Heaps, 
1985): 
      ∫             
 
 
          (9)      
Subject to the following constraints: 
q(0) =R, where R: Ore reserves  
q(T) = 0  
R(t) = R – q(t), where q(t): Extraction rate 
 
The Hamiltonian equation for the optimization is given by 
                                (10) 
 The first-order conditions that characterize the operator’s optimal strategy are 
(
  
  
)            (11) 
           (12) 
Condition (11) states that discounted marginal profits should be the same at all points in 
time. Otherwise, ore extraction could be shifted from a time of low discounted profits to a 
time of high discounted profits, resulting in an increase in V, whereas condition (12) states 
that the shadow price of extra reserves should equal to the marginal cost of finding them 
(Thomas, 2010). 
Further differentiating the previous equations, we obtain the slope of the extraction path, 
which is given by  
                   (
  
  
)                 (13) 
Rearranging, we obtain 
  
  
   (
  
  
)                              (14) 
which is less than 0 unless the price of the refined product rises too rapidly. Extraction 
rates will decline over time. 
If the royalty is σ(t) at time t, then the present value of a firm’s extraction plan becomes 
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  ∫             
 
 
         (13) 
and V is maximized when 
(
  
  
  )             (13) 
The slope of the extraction path is now given by 
  
  
 〈  (
  
  
)                         〉   
  
  
   
         
      (14) 
The slope of extraction path is now increased by the last term  
  
  
   
         
 . The extraction 
path with a royalty is therefore flatter than the no-tax extraction path because a firm will 
tend to extend the duration of extraction. The royalty reduces the exploration effort and 
causes the extraction rates to fall, at least initially. If marginal exploration costs increase 
rapidly, the royalty will not cause significant changes in exploration effort, and thus 
reduced extraction rates will lead to a longer mine life. If marginal exploration costs 
increase slowly, larger adjustments to the exploration effort will occur, and the mine life 
will be shortened (Thomas, 2010). 
Based on the extraction rates obtained from solving the optimization problem proposed by 
Equation 13, it is possible to generate a number of simulations by varying the rate of 
royalties and obtain a functional relationship between this value and the net present value 
of government revenues. 
4 OPTIMAL COAL ROYALTY IN COLOMBIA 
4.1  Optimal Royalty Rate 
Assuming that the proven reserves of thermic coal in Colombia can be exploited by a 
“representative firm”, the setup of the problem is designed to find the production plan that 
maximizes the present value of the cash flow received from mining of mineral deposits 
subject to the restrictions of mineral depletion (non-renewable condition), the amount of 
the reserves and the operational and financial profile of the “representative mine” over the 
life of mine. 
A block model13 is presented in which each block represents a proven reserve reported by 
the main producer regions (see Table 4). The model assumes an average overburden of 
10.2:1 (see Figure 8). 
 
                                            
13 Developed using the geo-statistical software “SGEM”.  
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Table 4. Proven Reserves of Colombian Thermic Coal 
Zone Department Proved Reserves (Mton) 
Atlantic Zone Guajira 3695 
 Cesar 1771 
 Cordoba 378 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Block model of Representative Coal Deposit 
 
The financial and operational profile was extracted from the "Comparative Analyses of 
State participation in the Gold mines and Coal in Colombia", the information of which is 
based on mines located in South America, interviews with mine operators, projects in 
Colombia and the international guidelines for coal mines (ERNST & YOUNG, 2012), Table 5 
summarizes the data used in the analysis. 
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 Table 5. Operating profile of a Representative Coal mine  
Profile Units Open Pit Coal 
Annual Ore Production Mton 250 
Average Stripping ratio14  10.2:1 
Processing Recovery15 % 92 
Life of Mine   
Exploration Years 3 
Execution Years 3 
Operation Years 24 
Capital Investment   
Initial investment MUS$ 657 
Exploration Investment % Initial investment 15 
Sustaining Capital % Initial investment 5 
Project financing  3 
Interest rate on debt % 6.25 
Coal Price   
Long Term Price US$/ton 90 
Operating Costs   
Mining & Processing Cost US$/ Ore ton 34.4 
Selling Cost US$/ Ore ton 23.2 
Reclamation Cost US$/ Ore ton 2.4 
 
An annual production rate of 250 Mtons was chosen to maintain the life of mine at less than 
25 years. This rate assumes an operating cost adjustment factor over the life of mine of 
form tα, where t is the time of the life of mine and α is assumed as 0.1, which simulates the 
increasing maintenance and operating costs due to depletion of the useful life of the 
equipment and higher future energy and diesel costs. 
To solve the optimization problem and estimate the coal production profile, we use Mixer 
Integer Linear Programming. This algorithm assumes that the deposits can be modeled as a 
set of blocks characterized by tons and qualities that can be sequenced to solve the 
previously discussed optimization problem, i.e., maximization of the net present value of 
the mine reserves subject to restrictions and mineral depletion. The formulation of the 
algorithm can be described as 16: 
Objective function: In this case the objective function seeks to maximize the net present 
value of the mine in the specific period 
                                            
14
 Stripping Ratio: Number of Waste Tons mined by each ton of Coal extracted.   
15
 it has assumed Coal needs to be washed. 
16
 The algorithm formulation has been extracted from (Rafiee & Asghari, 2008). 
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Total NPV = Max ∑ ∑     
  
       
  
        (15) 
T: Maximum number of scheduling periods, 
N: Total number of blocks of mineral to be scheduled, 
  
 : The NPV to be generated by mining block n in the period t and   
     
    
  
  
   Revenue generated by mining block n in the period t 
  
   Revenue generated by mining block n in the period t 
  
 : A binary variable equal to 1 if the block n is to be mined in the period t; otherwise, 0. 
If we assume σ: Royalty rate = 10% (thermic coal, production > 3 Mton per year) applied 
on a value basis (revenue), then the objective function for the “representative coal mine” 
will be: 
Max ∑ ∑    
          
        
  
        (16) 
Subject to: 
Reserves constraint: The constraints are constructed for each of the blocks such that all of 
the ore blocks considered must be mined once. 
∑   
  
           (16) 
Processing capacity: The total tons of ore processed cannot be greater than the processing 
capacity PCmax in a period t. 
∑      
  
                       (17) 
On: Tonnage in the ore block 
Mining capacity: The total of material (ore and waste) to be mined cannot exceed the total 
available equipment capacity (MCmax) for each period t. 
∑           
  
                        (18) 
Wn: Tonnage in the waste block 
Value-based royalty approach: Max ∑ ∑                 
     
        
  
        
Using the mining-planning package, which uses CPLEX17 algorithms to solve mixed MILP 
problems, we set up the objective function and constraints. Figure 9 shows the production 
plan for coal and the cash flow profile of the “representative mine” using the current 
royalty rate that maximizes the net present value. 
                                            
17 CPLEX is an optimization software package designed to solve mathematical 
programming problems. 
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Figure 9. Discounted cash flow of a Representative Mine 
 
Figure 10. Discounted cash flow of a Representative Mine 
 
RR: Royalty Rate 
The theoretical optimal royalty rate for a mining firm is zero because this choice would 
maximize its cash flow, but the government would not receive revenues in this scenario. 
Indeed, the government expects the largest possible royalty rate to maximize its revenue. 
Once the optimal sequence is found, a set of simulations is carried out by varying the 
royalty rates applied to the optimization algorithm, each of is used to calculate the net 
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present value of the “representative mine” and taxes18 paid to the government. Figure 10 
and Figure 11 show the cash flow profile of the “representative mine” and the discounted 
revenue received by the government for tax payments. 
Figure 11. Discounted revenue of the government 
 
Figure 12. Net Present Value Revenues of the Government 
 
Using the discounted revenue of the government, it is possible to derive a relationship 
between the royalty rate and the NPV of government revenues. Figure 12 shows this 
                                            
18 To simplify the problem, we considered only the income tax (25% of income tax and 
9% of CREE). 
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correlation and a polynomial regression, which has been estimated in R using ordinary 
least squares. 
The regression model is:   
                                
  
where NPVrg is the net present value of government revenues and RR is the royalty rate. 
 Table 6. Coefficients of Regression 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t| 
(Intercept)        11404 2039 5.592 0.000338 *** 
RR 389829 48819 7.985 2.25e-05 *** 
RR2 -2016223 256312 -7.866 2.53e-05 *** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 2344 on 9 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.877, Adjusted R-squared:  0.8497  
F-statistic:  32.1 on 2 and 9 DF,  p-value: 8.017e-05 
 
Assuming α = 0.05 and given p-value < 0.05, the variables (royalty rate) and (royalty rate)2 
are statistically significant in explaining the behavior of the NPV of government revenues. 
The F values and p-value of the regression show statistical significance. 
Based on the function obtained and use of differentiation techniques, the calculated 
maximum occurs when the royalty rate is 9.67%, i.e., the government revenue reaches a 
maximum of MUS$ 30347 when the royalty rate is 9.67%. 
4.2  Mining Royalty approach for Colombian Coal 
As mentioned previously, most approaches to royalty payment can be grouped into three 
categories: unit-based, value-based and profit- or income-based (Otto, et al., 2006). To 
determine the best methodology for the NPV of government revenues and private cash 
flows, we select a subset of the most commonly applied approaches in the industry for 
royalty determination to calculate the coal royalty in Colombia; these choices were 
analyzed using the previous methodology. The alternative approaches chosen were: 
 Profit-based payment  
 Adjusted-profit-based payment  
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4.2.1 Profit-based payment 
As stated previously, this methodology is based on the operational profit of a 
“representative mine”. The objective function continues to maximize the net present value 
of the mine in a specific period 
Total NPV = Max ∑ ∑     
  
       
  
         
T: Maximum number of scheduling periods, 
N: Total number of blocks of mineral to be scheduled, 
  
 : The NPV to be generated by mining block n in the period t and   
     
    
  
  
   Revenue generated by mining block n in the period t 
  
   Revenue generated by mining block n in the period t 
  
 : Binary variable equal to 1 if the block n is to be mined in the period t; otherwise, 0. 
 
However, If we assume σ: royalty rate = 10% (thermic coal, production > 3 Mton per year) 
applied to a profit-based approach, then the objective function for the “representative coal 
mine” will be: 
Total NPV = Max ∑ ∑          
  
       
  
        
The constraint of this optimization problem is the same, i.e.: 
∑   
  
           
∑      
  
                       
∑           
 
 
   
                
Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the cash flow profiles for a “representative mine” and the 
discounted revenue received by the government for tax payments. 
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Figure 13. Discounted cash flow of a Representative Mine 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Discounted revenue of the government 
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Figure 15 shows the relationship between royalty rate and the NPV of government 
revenues as well as a polynomial regression, which was estimated in R using ordinary least 
squares. 
Figure 15. Net Present Value of the Revenues of the Government 
 
The regression model is: 
                               
  
where NPVrg is the net present value of government revenues, and RR is the royalty rate. 
 Table 7. Coefficients of Regression 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t| 
(Intercept)        13063 1026 12.733 1.02e-08 *** 
RR 78108 9785 7.982 2.29e-06 *** 
RR2 -132039 19749 -6.686 1.50e-05 *** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 1559 on 13 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.8572, Adjusted R-squared:  0.8352  
F-statistic: 39.01 on 2 and 13 DF,  p-value: 3.209e-06 
 
Assuming α = 0.05 and given p-value < 0.05, the variables (royalty rate) and (royalty rate)2 
are statistically significant in explaining the behavior of the NPV of government revenues. 
The F values and p-value of the regression show statistical significance. 
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Based on the function, we calculate a maximum when the royalty rate is 29.58%, i.e., the 
revenue of government reaches a maximum of MUS$ 24614 when the royalty rate is 
29.58% 
4.2.2 Adjusted-Profit-based payment  
Although this approach is based on profit firms, the payment base is adjusted by assuming 
a percentage of the operating cost. The current study assumes a 50% operating cost, and 
thus the objective function can be defined as: 
 
Total NPV = Max ∑ ∑          
       
        
  
      
The constraint of this optimization problem is the same, i.e.: 
∑   
  
           
∑      
  
                       
∑           
 
 
   
                
Figure 16 and Figure 17 show the cash flow profiles of a “representative mine” and the 
discounted revenue received by the government for tax payments. 
Figure 16. Discounted cash flow of a Representative Mine 
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Figure 17. Discounted revenue of the government 
 
Figure 18 shows the relationship between royalty rate and the NPV of government 
revenues as well as a polynomial regression, which was estimated in R using ordinary least 
squares. 
Figure 18. Net Present Value of the Revenues of the Government 
 
The regression model is: 
                                
  
where, NPVrg is the net present value of government revenues and RR is the royalty rate. 
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 Table 8. Coefficients of Regression 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t| 
(Intercept)        11956 2000 5.978 0.000331 *** 
RR 233405 36324 6.426 0.000203 *** 
RR2 -794905 139063 -5.716 0.000446 *** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 2466 on 8 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.849, Adjusted R-squared:  0.8112 
F-statistic: 22.49 on 2 and 8 DF,  p-value: 0.0005199 
 
Assuming α = 0.05 and given p-value < 0.05, the variables (royalty rate) and (royalty rate)2 
are statistically significant in explaining the behavior of the NPV of government revenues. 
The F values and p-value of the regression show statistical significance. 
Based on the function, we calculate a maximum when the royalty rate is 14.68%, i.e., the 
government revenue reaches a maximum of MUS$ 29089 when the royalty rate is 14.68%. 
Figure 19 illustrates that royalties based on production value require royalty rates that are 
less than those of the royalty approaches based on profit. The NPV of the government 
revenues are greater in an approach based on production value; there is no significant 
difference with the profit-adjusted methodology. 
Figure 19. Net Present Value of the Revenues of the Government 
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Coal mining is one of the most important areas of the Colombian economy, and the value 
chain contains many linkages with a significant number of other activities, which makes 
this activity one that generates wealth directly. Additionally, the transmission mechanisms 
support the generation of wealth from other lines of the economy. The Colombian 
government receives income from royalties, taxes and compensations given the 
externalities that this activity generates, which, for thermic coal, accounts for 
approximately a 50% share of the operational profits. Colombia applies a coal royalty 
based on production value; although it has demonstrated stability, this approach ignores 
the fact that whether the mine makes a profit is related to the joint venture concepts 
introduced by risk associated with the geological conditions of the ore deposit.  
Using MILP, we estimated the optimal royalty rate under the current scheme of the coal 
royalty. The results are 9.67%, a value that is rather close to the value currently used by 
Colombian government, which is 10% for thermic coal with production greater than 3 
Mton. This scenario suggests that the actual rate is an optimal payment rate, which is true 
under the assumptions used for the analysis but not necessarily under other conditions. In 
a possible scenario of low prices over the long term, government revenues would decrease 
but the income of companies would not necessarily increase because the company 
strategies to reduce operating costs seek to maintain the same profit performance, which 
reveals a clear inefficiency in the current approach.  
The results indicate that the current approach to coal royalty payments maximizes the net 
present value of the government revenues; however, this approach represents a high risk 
that the income is not reinvested in the exploration of new areas and in the development of 
already discovered deposits. The approach based on the cash flows of private companies 
would return less revenue but nevertheless offer neutral conditions for investments by 
encouraging reinvestment in exploration and adding value in the long term due to a 
significant increase in the compensation taxes that companies should pay during different 
stages of its expansion projects (exploration, design, execution and operation). An 
interesting alternative to royalty payments for Colombian coal would be an approach based 
on profit by assuming a percentage of the operating costs, as shown in the model analyzed 
in this paper. This scenario represents a small difference in terms of the present value of 
government revenues with respect to the current scheme, but given the conditions of 
neutral incentives and efficient reinvestment in new areas of exploration, the alternative 
approach could create long-term value for the Colombian state. 
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